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Most advanced economies have experienced a striking decline in the volatility of 
aggregate economic activity since the early 1980s.   Volatility reductions are evident for 
output and employment at the aggregate level and across most industrial sectors and 
expenditure categories.  Inflation and inflation volatility have also declined dramatically.  
Previous studies offer several potential explanations for this “Great Moderation.”  Some 
studies credit improved monetary policy for reductions in the volatility of real economic 
activity and inflation (for example, Clarida, et al., 2000).  Others suggest that financial 
innovation and increased global integration play a role (Dynan et al., 2006).  Still others, 
pointing to evidence that output volatility fell more than sales volatility, highlight the 
potential role of better inventory control methods (for example, Kahn et al. 2002).  
Another line of research stresses “good luck” in the form of smaller exogenous shocks 
(for example, Stock and Watson, 2002). 
These explanations are not mutually exclusive.  As Bernanke (2004) remarks in 
his discussion of the Great Moderation: “Explanations of complicated phenomena are 
rarely clear cut and simple, and each … probably contains elements of truth.”  The main 
elements can also interact in complicated ways.  Perhaps, for example, the unsuccessful 
monetary policy of the 1970s or the more successful policy that followed facilitated the 
spread of volatility-reducing financial innovations.  Or perhaps sound monetary policy is 
easier when shocks are milder.  Nonetheless, even if no single factor fully explains the 
phenomenon, it is useful to amass evidence for and against particular hypotheses. 
We seek to address two fundamental questions about the Great Moderation:  What 
are its causes? And does it matter for economic welfare?  We consider a variety of 
evidence related to the Great Moderation, drawing mainly on U.S. data, and work 
towards a story with a few key themes.  Unlike most research on the topic, ours considers 
volatility behavior at the micro level for clues about the sources and consequences of 
aggregate volatility changes.  From a welfare perspective, a key issue is whether the 
Great Moderation led to lower consumption volatility and less economic uncertainty for 
individuals and households.  It matters, for example, whether the Great Moderation 
mainly involves transient sources of income volatility or long-lasting shocks, since 
consumers can more readily buffer transient income movements.  It also matters whether 
the decline in aggregate volatility translated into a decline in volatility at the micro level.   2 
 
As it turns out, the micro story is complex.  The average volatility of firm-level 
employment growth fell after the mid-1980s (Davis et al., 2006).  At the individual level, 
several indicators point to a large decline in the risk of unwanted job loss after the early 
1980s (Davis, 2008).  Declines in firm-level volatility and job-loss risks fit naturally with 
the decline in aggregate volatility.  However, when we consider household-level 
consumption changes, we find no evidence for a decline in volatility after 1980.  The 
evidence on individual earnings uncertainty points to a longer term rise, not a decline.  
Reconciling the fuller set of facts about micro volatility trends with the aggregate 
volatility decline presents a significant challenge, which we meet only part way. 
We begin with some facts about the Great Moderation, centered on the reduced 
volatility of real activity and the stabilization of inflation.  Our interpretation of this 
evidence casts doubt on explanations for the Great Moderation that emphasize better 
monetary policy or financial innovation. Instead, it points toward a technological story 
focused on the durable goods sector, and in particular on inventory investment.  We then 
examine inventory behavior in more detail and provide additional evidence of improved 
supply-chain management and a specific story for how it can explain reduced volatility.  
Next, we consider whether evidence about volatility in micro data is consistent with our 
story.  We present evidence on volatility in household-level consumption data and briefly 
discuss research on earnings and income uncertainty.  In the end, we conclude that a 
substantial component of the Great Moderation reflects reductions in short-term volatility 
that have had little or no apparent impact on consumption risks at the household level. 
We will not devote much space to the “good luck” hypothesis, even though a 
number of influential studies find support for it.  We interpret these findings as 
demonstrating the need for better models to explain the volatility reductions, or 
convincing evidence that measurable and plausibly exogenous, economic disturbances—
oil supply disruptions, wars, or weather, for example—can explain observed declines in 
the volatility of economic activity.
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1 For more discussion of the “good luck” hypothesis, see, for example, Stock and Watson (2002), 
Justiniano and Primiceri (2006), Ahmed et al. (2004). Along these lines, a recent study (Giannone, et al, 
2008) argues that the econometric models that underlie the support for good luck hypothesis are too simple.  
When they examine more complex models with a larger number of variables, they find that the reduced 
volatility comes from a change in the propagation of shocks rather than in the size of the shocks.  
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There is also an older debate about whether economic volatility fell after World 
War II in comparison to the prewar era.  That discussion focused on measurement issues 
and data quality.  Romer (1986) argued that the apparent postwar stabilization was only a 
“figment of the data” resulting from improved statistical methods and more complete 
measurement in the postwar era. Our discussion will focus exclusively on postwar data 
where, subject to controlling for compositional changes, we believe the data permit 
meaningful comparisons over time.   
 
1.  Declines in the Volatility of Aggregate Economic Activity 
 
An abrupt drop in the volatility of U.S. real GDP growth in the early 1980s, 
shown in Figure 1, provided the initial impetus for research on the Great Moderation.  
Early findings of a discrete break in volatility around 1984 (Kim and Nelson, 1999; 
McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000) encouraged a focus on comparisons before and after 
1984.  This approach conceals the fact that many economic series did not undergo an 
abrupt volatility drop around 1984. Some did so much earlier, some later, and for some, 
volatility trended down rather than dropped.   
We begin our exploration by decomposing real GDP growth and its volatility by 
what the National Income and Product Accounts call “major product” categories.  Figure 
2 shows annualized quarterly growth rates for the four major products that constitute 
GDP: nondurable goods, durable goods, services, and structures.  Each sectoral growth 
rate is scaled by its share of nominal GDP so that we can readily assess its contribution to 
the aggregate growth rate in Figure 1.   These charts show that only the durable goods 
sector experienced a volatility change in much the same way—in terms of magnitude and 
timing—as GDP.  Volatility of nondurables output fell after the early 1980s, but it was 
also lower in the 1960s before rising in the 1970s, and it was never nearly as high as the 
volatility of durables.  Thus, the volatility decline for nondurables—such as it was—
figures only modestly in the stabilization after the early 1980s.   Likewise, the service 
sector was never nearly as volatile as durable goods output; and moreover, its volatility 
fell in the early 1960s and again in the 1970s, long before the onset of the Great 
Moderation in the 1980s.  Structures underwent a decline in output volatility similar in 4 
 
timing to that for overall GDP, but the size of the sector and its contribution to GDP 
volatility are modest.  Thus, the drop in GDP volatility appears most closely related to 
developments in the durable goods sector. 
Figure 3 demonstrates this point in a different way by plotting the volatility 
(measured by rolling five-year standard deviations) of GDP growth, the growth 
contribution of durables sector output, and, for comparison, the growth contributions of 
inventory investment and residential investment. Our analysis begins in 1954, to diminish 
the impact of the Korean War period in which volatility was unusually high even for that 
era. Inventory investment, which overlaps with durable goods output, displays nearly as 
large a drop in volatility as durable goods output despite having an average GDP share of 
less than 1 percent.  Residential investment experienced a large drop in volatility 
beginning in the early 1980s, but its impact on overall GDP volatility is limited by its 
small share of aggregate activity (about 5percent). Thus, the residential investment sector 
played a small role in the Great Moderation, unless it had disproportionately large 
spillover effects on other sectors.   Volatility declines in other components of GDP (not 
shown) are also relatively modest, and not necessarily synchronized with the Great 
Moderation (Kahn, 2008). 
Figure 3 also suggests that both for total GDP and especially for durables, the 
volatility decline in the early 1980s was an acceleration of a trend dating back to World 
War II.  Indeed, Blanchard and Simon (2001) argue that the suddenness of the volatility 
drop is more apparent than real—that, in fact, large shocks in the 1970s and a deep 
contraction in the early 1980s obscure the longer term volatility decline that began well 
before the 1980s.  The idea that the 1970s (really the period from 1970 to 1983) were 
exceptional will be a recurring theme in our discussion.  But whereas Blanchard and 
Simon stress that volatility declines occurred across a broad range of GDP components, 
we argue that only the decline in the durable goods sector’s volatility is comparable to 
that of overall GDP in trend, timing, and magnitude.  
A related question is the extent to which the Great Moderation reflects a secular 
shift away from relatively volatile sectors.  In particular, the rising GDP share of a low-
volatility sector like services might be expected to moderate output volatility.  It turns 
out, however, that the secular shift toward services plays a modest role in the reduction of 5 
 
overall output volatility.  Specifically, using 1984:1 as a break point, we calculate that the 
volatility of quarterly GDP fell by 1.97 percentage points (as measured by standard 
deviations of annualized growth rates).  If we reconstruct GDP growth by fixing output 
shares for the four major product categories at their 1959 values, we instead calculate that 
the volatility of quarterly GDP growth fell by 1.75 percentage points.  According to this 
calculation, broad sectoral shifts account for about 12 percent of the long-term decline in 
GDP volatility. 
What about shifts within major product categories? For example, are shifts away 
from automobiles and toward electronic equipment partly responsible for the large 
decline in durables volatility?  Disaggregated output data from the National Income and 
Product Accounts are available only annually, which throws out higher frequency 
volatility, and only back to 1977, which leaves only seven observations prior to the 
commonly used break point of 1984.  A useful alternative is to construct output data from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) series on constant-dollar shipments and 
inventories, available monthly on a consistent basis from 1967 to 1997 for durable goods 
manufacturing and eleven industries at the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) level.  These data show a pattern of greatly reduced volatility after 1983, and they 
confirm that volatility varies greatly across the disaggregated industries.  However, 
repeating the same type of exercise as before, we find that volatility in the durables sector 
fell slightly more on a fixed-weight basis (51 percent) than the 48 percent drop from 
1967-83 to 1984-97 in the raw data.  We conclude that long-term sectoral shifts 
contribute to, but are not the main force behind, the Great Moderation.
2 
Another illuminating fact about the Great Moderation is that volatility fell 
substantially more, and earlier, for output than for final sales. In the durable goods sector, 
for example, comparing pre- and post-1983, the standard deviation of output growth 
                                                 
2 Another way to cut the data is to decompose the production function into factor input and productivity 
components.  Stiroh (2005) decomposes output growth into the growth of hours worked and labor 
productivity.  He finds that the volatility of both components fell, and that their covariance declined.  Gali 
and Gambetti (2007) provide additional evidence of a major shift in the pattern of comovements among 
output, hours, and labor productivity.  They interpret the evidence as favoring a “structural change” 
interpretation of the Great Moderation (rather than lower shock volatilities) in the form of more 
aggressively anti-inflationary monetary policy and reduced labor adjustment costs.   In contrast, Arias et al 
(2007) argue that a decline in the volatility of the Solow residual points toward the reduction of 
“productivity-like” shocks in the context of a real business cycle model of fluctuations. 
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declined from 17.8 percent to 7.7 percent, whereas the standard deviation of sales growth 
declined only from 10.3 to 8.4 percent (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000;  Blanchard 
and Simon, 2001; Kahn et al., 2002).  Since inventory investment makes up the 
difference between output and final sales, this fact implies a change in inventory 
behavior—either a reduction in the volatility of inventory investment or a change in the 
covariance between inventory investment and sales.  By national income accounting 
conventions, the services and structures sectors do not carry inventories, so the source of 
the change in inventory behavior must by definition lie in the goods sector.
3  We will 
return to this topic below when we discuss inventory behavior in more detail. 
Finally, not all volatility matters equally for economic welfare. Households can 
save and borrow to buffer their consumption against income volatility, particularly if the 
income movements are transitory.  Thus the volatility of consumption expenditure is 
much lower than that of GDP, especially if one removes expenditures on durables (which 
are really a form of investment).  In fact, whereas the volatility of real GDP growth fell 
by 2.5 percentage points post-1983, from 4.5 percent to 2 percent, the volatility of real 
expenditures on non-durables and services fell by just 0.8 percentage points, from 2.1 
percent to 1.3 percent.  This pattern suggests that that the decline in GDP volatility may 
have had only a modest impact on welfare.  
One possibility is that a substantial part of the output volatility decline has been of 
the transitory type.  To examine this, we consider how output volatility is apportioned 
across different “frequencies”—fluctuations of different durations.  We can think of 
fluctuations in economic activity as being composed of cycles of varying length: daily, 
weekly, yearly, or longer.  The amplitude of fluctuations in activity between daytime and 
nighttime, or weekday to weekend, is considerably larger than that between business 
cycle peaks and troughs; yet these “high-frequency” fluctuations are usually seen as 
beneficial or benign.  Even seasonal fluctuations are regarded as much less consequential 
for economic welfare in a modern economy, partly because of their relatively short 
duration and partly because of their predictable nature.  Indeed, the predictable seasonal 
                                                 
3 In structures, construction is counted as part of final output (see, for example, 
http://www.census.gov/const/c30/definitions.pdf ). There is, however, evidence of a change in inventory 
behavior in residential construction, even though it is not treated as such in the National Income and 
Product Accounts. (Kahn, 2000). 7 
 
component is typically removed from economic time series via “seasonal adjustment” so 
as to isolate the more consequential, unpredictable part. 
Fluctuations of a few years or longer, including the so-called business cycle, can 
have adverse welfare consequences because they are much less predictable and because 
they are longer and cannot be relied on to average out.  At a practical level, consumers 
have greater difficulty using savings to buffer expenditures against the uncertainty related 
to business cycles, as compared to seasonal cycles.  Milton Friedman’s (1957) 
“permanent income” theory of consumption recognizes this point explicitly, predicting 
that consumers smooth spending relative to short-term or “transitory” fluctuations in 
income but not relative to “permanent” changes, by which he meant changes of at least 
several years duration.  
To understand the frequency dimension of the Great Moderation, it is helpful to 
divide the post-Korean War era into three periods:  the relatively tranquil period from 
1954 to 1969, the turbulent period from 1970 to 1983, and the period from 1984 to the 
present.  Figure 4 decomposes GDP volatility into a high frequency component (cycles 
lasting fewer than 12 quarters) and a “business cycle” frequency component (longer 
cycles) for each period.
4  High-frequency volatility declined modestly from the first to the 
second period, then fell sharply after 1983.  This result suggests that the welfare 
consequences of the Great Moderation might be modest, because much of the Great 
Moderation reflects a drop in the type of short-term volatility that presents fewer 
difficulties for households in any event.  Another piece of evidence pointing in this 
direction is the greatly diminished role of temporary layoffs in recessionary 
unemployment movements since the mid-1980s (Groshen and Potter, 2003).  At the 
household level, consumption and living standards are probably less sensitive to 
temporary layoffs than to permanent job loss.  Temporary layoffs are also naturally 
associated with output movements of short duration, such as inventory corrections. 
                                                 
4 To obtain the decomposition in Figure 4, we start with quarterly observations on log real GDP from 
1954:Q1 to 2004:Q3 and remove the low frequency component by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter with 
smoothing parameter set to 1600.  We then apply the band pass filter routine in the E-Views software 
package.  We use the Christiano and Fitzgerald, 1999, fixed-length symmetric filter with twelve leads and 
lags for Figure 4, but obtain similar results with other methods. The frequency decomposition yields two 
time series, one for cycles longer than 12 quarters and one for shorter cycles.  Lastly, we calculate the 
variance of each time series within each subperiod and report the results in Figure 4. 8 
 
Figure 4 also shows that business cycle volatility jumped sharply in the middle 
period and then returned to approximately the same level as in the 1954-69 period.  
Someone lumping the first two periods together might see a decline in both types of 
volatility in the post-1983 era, but that approach masks highly volatile business cycle 
fluctuations from 1970 to 1983 compared to before and after.
5  We have repeated the 
exercise of Figure 4 for durable goods output and obtained a similar pattern.  This result 
reinforces the view that developments in the durable goods sector play an important role 
in the Great Moderation.   
 
2.  Inflation and the Role of Monetary Policy 
 
In addition to the apparent break in volatility around 1983, that year is also often 
viewed as a turning point in monetary policy: the beginning of the Volcker-Greenspan 
era of low and stable inflation.  A large literature, led by Clarida et al. (2000), debates the 
extent to which there was a change in monetary policy regime, one that had the effect of 
reducing both inflation and output volatility.  For a change in monetary policy regime to 
have both effects requires not just a more aggressive anti-inflationary policy, which 
according to traditional policy analysis would actually increase output volatility, but a 
superior policy that improves the locus of the tradeoff.   
Low and stable inflation is not uniquely a post-1983 phenomenon.  Inflation 
volatility from 1954 to 1969 is almost as low as after 1983.  This does not necessarily 
refute the “better monetary policy” hypothesis, but it requires a more complicated story.  
How could a low-inflation policy in one era leave output volatility high, and then, some 
15 years later be responsible for dramatically reducing output volatility?  One hypothesis 
that can reconcile these facts goes as follows: Monetary policy can reduce inflation 
volatility in two ways: 1) it can choose a different point in a fixed tradeoff between 
inflation volatility and output volatility; or 2) it can somehow get “better” (more 
                                                 
5 Ahmed et al. (2004), for example, provide evidence that the volatility decline after 1983 was essentially 
uniform across all frequencies.  Figure 4 does not contradict their finding, but it suggests that treating the 
1970-83 period separately, especially with detrended levels rather than growth rates, could produce a 
different result.  Kahn (2008) has more detailed results confirming the statistical significance of the relative 
decline in high frequency volatility. 9 
 
efficient) and reduce both.  The story would be that the 1955-69 period is an example of 
the former, while the post-1983 period is a case where policy became more efficient. 
While one can tell such a story, little evidence supports it.  Romer and Romer 
(2002a, 2002b) argue, in fact, that policy in the 1950s was similar to policy in the 1990s.   
In addition, the “better monetary policy” story would have to account for the range of 
facts about the Great Moderation described in the previous section, including the long 
downward trend in durables output volatility, and the changes in inventory behavior 
implied by the small drop in sales volatility compared to output volatility. 
A different argument for the “better monetary policy” hypothesis is that it is the 
only story compatible with a discrete drop in volatility after the early 1980s.  Improved 
inventory management is unlikely to have emerged suddenly.  And financial innovation 
is most plausibly a gradual process, even if there were specific discrete events such as the 
demise of Regulation Q interest rate ceilings in the early 1980s (for example, Bernanke, 
2007).   
Monetary policy, on the other hand, can be subject to sudden changes in 
“regime.”  In the last 20 years, for example, many central banks around the world 
adopted “inflation targeting” regimes that arguably involve a discrete departure from 
earlier policies.  In October 1979, the Federal Reserve under Volcker shifted from 
targeting the federal funds rate to targeting nonborrowed reserves, a regime that lasted 
until 1983.  A number of studies (for example, Clarida et al., 2000) provide evidence that 
the interest rate targeting regimes pre-1979 and post-1983 were fundamentally different, 
the former resulting in both inflation and output instability.  
Nonetheless, the evidence for an important shift in monetary policy regime is not 
clear cut.  Sims and Zha (2006) argue that changes in monetary policy regimes were 
relatively inconsequential and in any case do not line up very well with changes in 
volatility.  In a series of papers, Orphanides (2002, for example) argues that the policy 
regime of the 1970s was not fundamentally different from earlier policies, but the Fed 
was hit with large structural changes (a higher “natural” unemployment rate and lower 
trend productivity growth) for which it had limited and imperfect information in real 
time.   10 
 
There are, moreover, good reasons to doubt the hypothesis that advances in the 
conduct of monetary policy are responsible for the discrete drop in volatility post-1983.  
Modern research on monetary policy points to a variety of factors that influence the 
efficacy of monetary policy.  These include the credibility of the policymaker, 
transparency, and commitment to rules-oriented decision making.  With hindsight, the 
Volcker-Greenspan era looks like a discrete break with the immediate past, but it is not 
plausible that the Fed achieved enhanced credibility overnight.  In addition, increased 
transparency has been an evolutionary process.  The Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) began making public its interest rate target decisions only in 1994.  It did not 
begin releasing statements explaining its policy decisions until 1998, and the 
informational content of these statements continues to evolve.  Thus, the contention that 
there was a discrete breakthrough for monetary policy in 1983 that explains the drop in 
output volatility after the early 1980s looks shakier under close scrutiny. 
International evidence also provides grounds for skepticism about the role of 
monetary policy.  Since the early 1980s, most industrialized countries experienced 
reduced output and inflation volatility, but with no clear connection to changes in 
monetary policy.  Some countries adopted the policy of “inflation targeting,” some did 
not, and among those that did, there was considerable variety in its implementation.  
Truman (2003) finds some evidence that inflation targeting countries experienced larger 
declines in output volatility, but there were differences in initial conditions between 
adopters and non-adopters.  A more robust conclusion is that volatility dropped for nearly 
all industrialized countries, but the evidence is mixed regarding any connection with the 
timing and specifics of monetary policy changes.  
The 1970s experience does point to a role for monetary policy in the Great 
Moderation, but not in the way usually emphasized by adherents of the “better monetary 
policy” explanation.  The evidence described earlier points to an underlying downward 
trend for aggregate volatility in much of the postwar era, interrupted by the turbulent 
1970s (Blanchard and Simon, 2001).  This reading of the evidence suggests that policy 
mistakes during the 1970s raised volatility for a time.  Ending those mistakes with a 
return to policies resembling those of the 1950s and early 1960s allowed volatility to 
return to its underlying postwar path.  According to this view, the resumption of sound 11 
 
monetary policy led to a large drop in volatility by removing the role of policy mistakes 
in the 1970s, restoring an underlying postwar trend toward lower output volatility.   
  To summarize, the apparent suddenness of the drop in output volatility after the 
early 1980s does not persuade us that new-found skill in monetary policy making drove 
the Great Moderation.  There is evidence that the Great Moderation began before the 
Greenspan-Volcker era, and in any case monetary policy did not experience a once-and-
for-all change in 1983.  The case is stronger that monetary policy mistakes or unusual 
shocks in the 1970s temporarily overwhelmed the forces behind the Great Moderation, 
until the economic environment or policy making reverted to something resembling 
earlier times.  A persuasive case for a more positive role for monetary policy requires: 1) 
showing how monetary policy in the post-1983 period is distinct from the policies of both 
the 1970s and earlier; and 2) a model that traces changes in sectoral volatility patterns 
and inventory behavior to changes in monetary policy. 
 
3.  Inventory Behavior 
 
The behavior of aggregate inventory investment has changed significantly since 
the early 1980s. Here we focus on the durable goods sector, where the most dramatic 
declines in output volatility occurred and where we have also seen evidence of a change 
in inventory behavior.
6  Traditionally, the inventory literature focuses on disaggregated 
data, in particular on data for two-digit manufacturing industries, but aggregate data have 
distinct advantages for our purposes. Disaggregated data are potentially misleading, 
because it is impossible to judge whether measured changes in inventory behavior reflect 
genuine shifts or simply result from less meaningful relocation of inventories between 
sectors.  For example, if manufacturers shift final goods inventories downstream to 
wholesalers and retailers, or materials inventories upstream to their suppliers, 
manufacturing inventories decline relative to their shipments.  Yet that decline would be 
largely offset by inventory increases elsewhere in the economy, and a mere re-labeling 
would be misinterpreted as evidence of structural change. We should note that the 
                                                 
6 We refer the reader to Bils and Kahn (2000) and Kahn et al. (2002) for discussions of inventory behavior 
in the nondurable goods sector.   12 
 
aggregate U.S. data we use are not entirely immune from this criticism—for example, 
firms could shift materials inventories offshore to foreign suppliers.  
Because output is the sum of final sales and inventory investment, we can 
decompose the variance of output growth rates into components for sales growth and 
inventory investment, plus a covariance term.
7  The covariance term reflects the extent to 
which changes in inventory investment are positively correlated with sales growth and 
thereby add to output volatility.  This decomposition allows us to track the contributions 
of sales and inventory investment to output volatility over time.  Since sales volatility 
declines little, as mentioned above, we focus on the other two terms of the 
decomposition.  They are shown in Figure 5, which plots the rolling five-year variance of 
the inventory investment term and the sales-inventory covariance term for the durable 
goods sector.  Both terms show substantial downward trends, with the covariance term 
accounting for a very big drop in output volatility after the early 1980s.   The results 
displayed in Figure 5 motivate additional investigation of inventory behavior. 
We inspected the inventory-sales ratio for the durable goods sector using a data 
source that captures all durable goods inventories, including those situated outside the 
manufacturing sector.   After peaking in the years 1982-83, the ratio trends downward for 
nearly two decades (the solid line in Figure 6).  By itself, the downward trend in the 
inventory-sales ratio after the early 1980s is not proof of technical progress in inventory 
management.  It could, instead, reflect compositional shifts or movement along a fixed 
technological tradeoff in response to rising inventory carrying costs. Maccini et al. (2004) 
argue that inventory investment is responsive to very persistent changes in real interest 
rates.  But the timing of the break in the trend is striking.  The inventory-sales ratio has 
also become less volatile since the early 1980s, suggesting that businesses were hit by 
smaller shocks, made smaller mistakes or could more readily correct inventory 
                                                 
7 Although inventory investment, because it can be negative, does not have a conventionally defined 
growth contribution, we can define it indirectly as the difference between the growth rate of output and the 
growth contribution of final sales (cf. Kahn et al., 2002).  Following Whelan (2000), we approximate the 
latter in terms of the real growth rate of sales and the nominal share of sales in output.  Letting  xy γ  denote 
the growth contribution of x to output y, where x = s for sales and x = i for inventories, define the growth 
contribution of inventory investment as  
  iy yy sy γ γγ ≡−
 
where  sys s s y γ γθ = ,  sy θ  is the nominal share of s in y (measured as the average of current and lagged shares). 
The growth contribution of a variable to itself is just its growth rate. 13 
 
imbalances.  Again, this pattern is not conclusive, but it is consistent with the idea of 
improved inventory management technologies. 
Kahn et al. (2002) describe results from forecasting equations with sales and 
inventories that point to another important difference before and after 1983. Before 1983, 
sales helped to forecast inventories more than inventories helped to forecast sales. After 
1983, they were similar, reflecting both a decrease in the usefulness of sales in 
forecasting inventories and an increase in the usefulness of inventories in forecasting 
sales.  Moreover, the variance of sales forecast errors dropped precipitously, meaning that 
less of the variation in sales was unpredicted given prior sales and inventories. These 
results are also consistent with the idea that firms became better able to anticipate sales 
and adjust inventories in advance.
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A Theory of Improved Inventory Control 
One approach to assessing the role of improved inventory control is to be agnostic 
about the deeper story for technological change and look instead for changes in 
parameters or shocks in a dynamic empirical model of inventory behavior. McCarthy and 
Zakrajsek (2007) apply this approach to industry-level manufacturing data, which makes 
it not directly comparable to the GDP-level and sector-level data we use.
9  They 
investigate the extent to which changes in the behavior of manufacturing inventories after 
1983 reflect better inventory management versus changes in what they call the “macro 
structure,” which includes shock magnitudes and the effects of monetary policy.  They 
find evidence for both types of changes.  
A second approach is to apply a specific optimizing model of improved inventory 
control as in Kahn et al. (2002), which draws on earlier work by Kahn (1987) and Bils 
                                                 
8 Stock and Watson (2002) are skeptical of the role of inventory management in the Great Moderation.  But 
they focus on four-quarter growth rates of economic time series, a transformation that essentially filters out 
the higher frequency volatility associated with inventory investment.  Indeed, it should be no surprise that 
inventory behavior appears less important in explaining the (smaller) volatility declines of four-quarter 
growth rates.  Still, looking at four-quarter growth rates might be a reasonable thing to do if changes in high 
frequency volatility were economically uninteresting or played a small role in the Great Moderation, but we 
have argued otherwise.  Stock and Watson’s other grounds for skepticism—the fact that sales volatility 
declined, and that most inventories in manufacturing are raw materials or work-in-progress—are addressed 
in the next section.   
9 The disaggregated manufacturing data are subject to the measurement concerns raised earlier—both the 
concerns about interactions with upstream and downstream activity, and also those about basing 
conclusions regarding the pre-1984 era on data that are primarily from the exceptionally volatile 1970s. 14 
 
and Kahn (2000).  In this model, firms carry finished goods inventories to avoid 
stockouts in the face of uncertain demand, trading off the cost of forgone profits against 
the cost of carrying inventories.  If demand is serially correlated, mistakes in forecasting 
sales get magnified in production volatility, so that it exceeds the volatility of sales.  To 
see why, suppose sales are unexpectedly low.  Not only does this leave the firm with 
more inventories than planned, but the firm now needs lower inventories than it 
previously thought, because the persistence of the sales shock means lower sales than 
earlier forecasts for some time. Consequently, the firm cuts production by more than the 
current sales shock.  
Given this “stockout-avoidance” mechanism, suppose that better technology gives 
firms better information about future demand disturbances.  Then firms make smaller 
errors in production decisions, and the output volatility induced by correcting those errors 
diminishes.  In addition, firms hold fewer inventories because they now face less 
uncertainty.   
This story can account for reduced production volatility in absolute terms and 
relative to sales volatility, but it has important drawbacks as a full explanation for the 
changes in inventory, output, and sales behavior that we have documented.  First, 
depending on when the firm receives information regarding demand shocks, the story has 
counterfactual implications for sales volatility.  To see this point, suppose that better 
technology yields earlier information about a future demand increase, in time to build up 
inventories before the demand increase arrives.  Then when the demand increase actually 
occurs, the firm draws down the inventories it built up in anticipation.  This result is 
consistent with the more negative correlation of inventory investment and sales, but the 
advance information has the counterfactual implication of greater sales volatility.  Why?  
Because the firm is better able to accommodate fluctuating demand by adjusting 
production, without running out of stock. Second, the stockout-avoidance approach does 
not apply so obviously or directly to the durable goods sector, much of which is best 
characterized as production-to-order rather than production-to-stock.  A related point (see 
Blinder and Maccini, 1991, Humphries et al., 2001, among others) is that most 
inventories, particularly in durable goods, are of materials or works in process, not final 
goods.  Finally, while there is much anecdotal evidence concerning technology 15 
 
improvements that provide better information about future sales, there is no direct 
evidence to assist in specifying a model.   
Kahn (2008) develops a variation on the “better information” story that  addresses 
these concerns.  Firms are production-to-order, and therefore hold only inventories of 
materials and works-in-process.  They must order materials in advance.    A stockout 
occurs when works-in-process inventories are insufficient to allow the firm to meet its 
(stochastic) orders, in which case the order gets added to the stock of unfilled orders. This 
setup is broadly consistent with the argument of Irvine and Schuh (2005), who attribute a 
substantial volatility decline to reduced co-movement between the manufacturing and 
trade sectors.   
The intuition for how the model works is similar to that of the stockout-avoidance 
motive in Kahn (1987), described above, except that stockouts occur internally when the 
firm runs out of works-in-process inventories, rather than externally with finished goods 
stocks.  Once again, because orders for final goods are serially correlated, errors in 
forecasting demand get magnified in the volatility of production (sales plus inventory 
investment).  The key difference is that the firm produces “to order” so that the improved 
information is not translated so directly into the accommodation of demand shocks and 
greater sales volatility.  Sales are shipments of completed production, so some of the 
reduced production volatility lessens the volatility of shipments, potentially offsetting the 
effect (still present here) from improved accommodation of demand shocks.  
So this model immediately addresses all but one of the objections raised above:  It 
is specifically tailored to characteristics of the durable goods sector in that it assumes 
production-to-order rather than production-to-stock.  It features works-in-process rather 
than final goods inventories.  It has the property that better information about final orders 
has the potential to reduce the volatility of output and sales, the former more than the 
latter.   
The remaining objection to this approach concerns the lack of direct evidence of 
firms’ improved ability to forecast orders.  Here we consider survey data obtained from 
the Institute of Supply Management on average lead times for orders of production 
materials.  This is imperfect evidence and is not confined to the durable goods sector, but 
it is striking nonetheless.  The series is depicted in Figure 6, plotted against the inventory-16 
 
sales ratio for the durable goods sector.  While the average lead-time series does not 
exhibit the underlying downward trend of the volatility series, it does feature a clear drop 
in level post-1983 relative to earlier.  It also shows some elevation in the more volatile 
1970s.  
What is the connection between shorter lead times and better information?  In 
deciding on its materials orders, the firm must base its forecast of future final goods 
orders on whatever information it has available to it at the time.  The longer the firm can 
delay materials orders, the more information it has about its final goods orders at any 
given date.   Consequently, the firm can order materials more accurately and carry 
smaller precautionary stocks..  
Of course, what allows for shorter lead times is not modeled but taken as direct 
evidence of technical progress.   Given that the goal of the “just-in-time” approach is 
greater flexibility to reduce the need to carry large stocks, this is a reasonable 
interpretation, but it may be only part of the story.  For example, some of the increased 
lead times in the 1970s could be caused by Nixon-era price controls, which created 
shortages and bottlenecks in materials deliveries.  It would be natural for firms concerned 
about an inability to obtain materials in a given time frame to order farther in advance.  
This observation does not negate the mechanism in the model, but it points out that 
something other than technical progress can yield sustained movements in average lead 
times.  Perhaps price controls, or even the high inflation of the 1970s, disrupted market 
signals and caused some of the rise in lead times and volatility, but this hypothesis awaits 
further research.   
There is little doubt that vast resources have been devoted to improving what is 
generally referred to as “supply-chain management.”  How this translates into observable 
behavior and data is another question entirely.  As Mentzer et al. (2001) write:   
 
“Despite the popularity of the term Supply Chain Management, both in academia 
and practice, there remains considerable confusion as to its meaning.  Some 
authors define SCM in operational terms involving the flow of materials and 
products, some view it as a management philosophy, and some view it in terms of 




They go on to define the term as “the systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional 
business functions and the tactics across these business functions within a particular 
company and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes of improving 
the long-term performance of the individual companies and the supply chain as a whole.”  
This definition is vague, but it clearly encompasses a number of specifics, notably what 
the authors refer to as a logistics system: “the total flow of materials, from the acquisition 
of raw materials to delivery of finished products, to the ultimate users, as well as the 
related counter-flows of information that both control and record material movement.”  
The strong prediction of the model is that shorter lead times give rise to a 
reduction in output volatility and a somewhat smaller reduction in the volatility of final 
sales.  While the magnitudes of these declines depend on specifics such as the average 
inventory-sales ratio (which is endogenous in the model and depends on price-cost 
markups and inventory holding costs) and the ratios of inputs to gross output at each 
stage of production, the qualitative results require only some degree of persistence in 
final goods orders.   
 
4.  Changes in Volatility at the Micro Level 
 
  Thus far, our discussion suggests that much of the Great Moderation involves a 
reduction in the volatility of durable goods output, and much of that reflects significant 
changes in inventory dynamics.  We turn now to volatility trends at the level of firms, 
individuals and households and ask whether the micro evidence sheds additional light on 
the Great Moderation and its consequences. 
 
Firm-Level Volatility 
Figure 7 plots the average volatility of firm-level employment in the United States 
from 1977 to 2001.  Davis et al. (2006) construct the figure using annual Census Bureau 
data on domestic employment for all firms in the U.S. private sector.  They calculate the 
rolling standard deviation of employment growth rates for each firm and then compute 
the employment-weighted mean across firms for each year.  As shown in the figure, the 
average volatility of firm-level employment fell from 49 percent in 1978 and 53 percent 18 
 
in 1987 to 38 percent in 2001.  Thus, firm-level volatility shows a substantial long-term 
decline, but the timing differs somewhat from the decline in aggregate output volatility.  
The trend decline in firm-level employment volatility holds across one-digit industry 
groups and is not especially concentrated in the goods-producing sector. 
Figure 7 also highlights a striking difference in the volatility behavior of publicly 
traded and privately held firms.
10  Volatility is high and declining for privately held firms, 
but low and rising for publicly traded firms.  This “volatility convergence” between 
publicly traded and privately held firms helps in understanding other recent findings on 
trends in firm-level variability.  Comin and Philippon (2005) and Comin and Mulani 
(2006), for example, document a large upward trend in the volatility of sales among 
publicly traded firms.  An influential paper by Campbell et al. (2001) documents a large 
upward trend in the volatility of firm-level equity returns for U.S. common stocks.  
Specifically, they find that the variance of firm-level returns in daily data more than 
doubles from 1962 to 1997.  They also show that the trend increase in return volatility 
reflects a rise in the volatility of the idiosyncratic, firm-specific component.  These 
findings for publicly traded firms led some observers to conclude that overall firm-level 
volatility rose sharply in recent decades, in puzzling contrast to the large drop in 
aggregate volatility.  Figure 7, however, shows otherwise.  
Why does the volatility trend among publicly traded firms depart so sharply from 
the overall trend?  At one level, the answer is simple: Publicly traded firms account for 
less than one-third of private-sector employment, so there is much room for the trend 
among publicly traded firms to depart from the overall trend.  Digging deeper reveals 
another, more interesting answer: There was a pronounced shift in the economic selection 
process governing entry into the set of publicly traded firms, and this shift greatly 
affected volatility trends among publicly traded firms.   
To see this point, it is important to first recognize the large influx of newly listed 
firms in the 1980s and 1990s.  Fama and French (2004) report that the number of new 
listings (mostly initial public offerings) on major U.S. stock markets jumped from 156 
                                                 
10 Here, “publicly traded” refers to firms with equity securities listed on a stock exchange or traded in over-
the-counter markets.  As a practical matter, given the heavy reliance on COMPUSTAT for research in this 
area, “publicly traded” means firms that are also in COMPUSTAT, which has reasonably comprehensive 
coverage of publicly traded firms since the addition of NASDAQ listings in 1973.  For publicly traded 
firms, it is possible to compute the volatility of sales and employment; they exhibit similar trends. 19 
 
per year in the 1973-1979 period to 549 per year in 1980-2001.  Remarkably, about 10 
percent of listed firms are new in each year from 1980 to 2001.  Similarly, Davis et al. 
(2006) report that firms newly listed in the 1980s and 1990s account for about 40 percent 
of employment among all publicly traded firms by the late 1990s.  So the influx of new 
listings in the 1980s and 1990s is large in number and rather quickly accounts for a large 
share of activity.   
In addition, Fama and French (2004) provide evidence that new listings are riskier 
than seasoned public firms by a variety of measures and that they become increasingly 
risky relative to seasoned firms after 1979.  Based on their review of the evidence, they 
conclude that the upsurge of new listings explains much of the trend increase in 
idiosyncratic stock return volatility documented by Campbell et al. (2001).  They also 
suggest that there was a decline in the cost of equity that allowed weaker firms and those 
with more distant payoffs to issue public equity.  A more recent study by Brown and 
Kapadia (2007) reaches an even stronger conclusion.  Using a regression methodology, 
they find that “there is generally no significant trend in idiosyncratic risk after accounting 
for the year a firm lists.”  They also provide other evidence that firm-specific risks in the 
economy as a whole did not increase, even though the volatility of firm-level equity 
returns rose because of an influx of successively riskier cohorts. 
Davis et al. (2006) obtain similar results for firm-level employment volatility.  
Using a regression framework, they find that simple cohort effects for the year of first 
listing account for two-thirds of the volatility rise among publicly traded firms from 1978 
to 2001.  In contrast, firm size, age and industry effects—separately and in 
combination—account for little of the volatility rise among publicly traded firms. 
 
The Risk of Job Loss 
As discussed in Davis (2008), a wide variety of labor market indicators point to a 
secular decline in the risk of job loss.  These indicators include unemployment inflows by 
experienced workers in the Current Population Survey (CPS), the three-year job-loss rate 
in the CPS Displaced Worker Survey, several measures for the gross rate of job 
destruction at the level of individual employers, the number of workers involved in mass 
layoff events, and the number of new claims for unemployment insurance benefits.  All 20 
 
of these indicators point to a secular decline in the risk of job loss, although the extent 
and timing of the decline differ among the indicators.  One of the most striking declines 
occurs in weekly new claims for unemployment insurance benefits. This measure of 
unwanted job loss fell from 0.46 percent of nonfarm employment per week in 1970-1983 
to 0.30 percent in 1984-2007 and 0.27 percent since 1993.  
Similarly, Current Population Survey data show a dramatic decline in 
unemployment inflows as a percentage of employment since the early 1980s.  Davis et al. 
(2007) provide evidence that about half of the long-term decline in unemployment inflow 
rates is explained by the reduction in the gross job destruction rates and the volatility of 
firm-level growth rates.  Hence, their study provides evidence of a direct link between the 
secular decline in firm-level volatility in Figure 7 and the secular decline in the incidence 
of job loss. 
 
Consumption Volatility and Income Uncertainty 
In a permanent income model of consumption expenditures with stable 
preferences, a decline in the variability of persistent income innovations produces a 
decline in the average magnitude of consumption changes.  The intuition is 
straightforward: smaller shocks to permanent income necessitate smaller adjustments to 
consumption. In the light of this implication, we investigate whether the average 
magnitude of household-level consumption changes rose or fell over time.  A rise 
indicates an increase in economic uncertainty for the average household. Conversely, if 
the Great Moderation, the decline in firm-level volatility, and the reduced risk of job loss 
led to a more tranquil economic environment for the average household, then permanent-
income logic implies a decline in the average magnitude of household-level consumption 
adjustments. 
We take a simple approach to this issue using quarterly data from the interview 
segment of the Consumer Expenditure Survey, which has a short panel component.  To 
measure the magnitude of household-level consumption adjustments, we compute the 
absolute value of the log change in consumption expenditures for each household and 
then average over households.  This average value for the magnitude of household-level 
consumption changes is our measure of consumption volatility.  To assess whether trends 21 
 
in consumption volatility differ between richer and poorer households, we sort 
households into deciles of predicted consumption before computing the consumption 
volatility.
11  We sort the data this way to ensure that we do not overlook important 
changes in consumption volatility for certain groups, such as the lowest deciles, that we 
might miss by looking only at the overall average consumption volatility.  
Figure 8 shows consumption volatility by decile of predicted consumption for two 
periods. There are two results. First, consumption volatility rises with the consumption 
level in a given time period, except at the low end of the distribution. Second, and more 
important for our purposes, there is no evidence for a decline in consumption volatility 
after the 1980s. In fact, Figure 8 points to a modest increase in household consumption 
volatility over most of the consumption distribution.  This second result is quite 
surprising given the declines in aggregate and firm-level volatility and the reduced risk of 
job loss.  Indeed, by capturing the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s in the first of 
the two periods shown in Figure 8, one might worry that we stack the deck in favor of 
finding a trend decline in consumption volatility.  For this reason, the absence of such a 
trend is all the more surprising. Taken at face value, and seen through the lens of the 
permanent-income theory, the second result says that the Great Moderation failed to 
deliver more economic tranquility in the form of less consumption risk for the average 
household.  
Given the surprising nature of the result in Figure 8, it would be reassuring to 
know that other consumption data tell a similar story.  Gorbachev (2007) uses data on 
food expenditures in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to estimate the volatility of 
household consumption after controlling for predictable variation associated with 
movements in real interest rates and changes in family structure.  She finds that the 
volatility of household consumption expenditures increased over the period from 1970 to 
                                                 
11   We restrict attention to nondurable goods and services and consider six-month changes in expenditures 
per adult equivalent in the consumer unit.  Results are similar for three-month and nine-month changes.  
Our measure of adult equivalents is 1.0 times the first adult plus 0.7 times each additional adult in the same 
consumer unit plus 0.5 times each child in the consumer unit. We computed predicted consumption based 
on a regression of log expenditures per adult equivalent on sex of the household head, a quartic polynomial 
in the head’s age, four educational attainment categories, marital status of the head, interview month, and 
employment status of the head and the head’s spouse, if there is one.  We perform this sort based on the 
first interview with consumption expenditures for the consumer unit 22 
 
2002.  Thus, data from both the Consumer Expenditures Survey and the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics point to a trend rise in consumption volatility.  
Another approach to assessing trends in economic uncertainty at the level of 
households and individuals is to exploit income or earnings data.  There is an enormous 
literature on earnings inequality and changes in the structure of wages, but few previous 
studies seek to quantify long term changes in earnings uncertainty from the vantage point 
of the individual.  An exception is Cunha and Heckman (2007), who estimate the 
contribution of earnings uncertainty to the rise in earnings inequality.  Their method uses 
data on schooling choices, in combination with data on earnings outcomes, to decompose 
the realized variance of earnings into a component that is predictable by individuals and 
an unpredictable component that is not.  They estimate a substantial rise in the variance 
of the unforecastable component in the present value of earnings uncertainty among 
young workers. This result is broadly consistent with the evidence of increased 
consumption volatility. 
A recent paper by Dynan et al. (2008) investigates the volatility of household 
income using data from the PSID for households whose heads are at least 25 years old 
and not yet retired. They find that the standard deviation of two-year percent changes in 
household-level income rose by a third from the early 1970s to the early 2000s, with 
trend increases in all major age and education groups. They trace the rise of household 
income volatility to a greater frequency of very large income changes.  While greater 
income volatility does not imply greater income uncertainty, it is certainly suggestive of 
such a development.  In this respect, the results in Dynan et al. (2008) lend credence to 
the evidence of rising consumption volatility.  In addition, Dynan et al. (2008) summarize 
many studies that investigate trends in earnings and income volatility or trends in 
estimated earnings uncertainty based on statistical models.  Although the studies differ 
greatly in their particulars, none show a decline in income volatility or earnings 
uncertainty that even approximates the decline in aggregate volatility, and the vast 





Summary of Micro Volatility Evidence and Implications  
The volatility of firm-level employment growth rates fell after the early to mid 
1980s.  The decline in average firm-level volatility is similar in magnitude to the decline 
in aggregate volatility, but the timing differs.  Although we did not discuss it here, the 
volatility of state-level employment growth rates also fell after the 1980s (Carlino et al., 
2007).  Among publicly traded firms, the volatility in real activity and in equity returns 
rose sharply after the early 1980s.  This rise in volatility among publicly traded firms is a 
striking phenomenon, but it mainly or entirely reflects shifts in the selection process 
governing which firms become public.  Hence, considerable care is required when 
drawing inferences about the sources and nature of the Great Moderation from data on 
equity returns or from any data limited to publicly traded firms.   
Declines in firm-level volatility and gross job-destruction rates are closely linked 
to declines in the risk of unwanted job loss, as reflected in sharply lower unemployment 
inflows after the early 1980s.  In this respect, data on aggregate volatility, average firm-
level volatility, job destruction rates, and the incidence of unemployment all point to a 
much more quiescent economic environment since the early 1980s.  In contrast, data on 
labor earnings, income and consumption expenditures do not conform to a story of 
greater tranquility and lower uncertainty at the household or individual level.  Although 
there is much room for further research, the available evidence suggests at least a modest 
increase in individual and household economic uncertainty. Assuming that this 
assessment of trends in household-level consumption volatility and related measures of 
individual uncertainty holds up under further study, it highlights a puzzle that research on 
the Great Moderation has yet to confront: Why has the dramatic decline in the volatility 
of aggregate real activity, and the roughly coincident decline in firm-level volatility and 
job-loss rates, not translated into sizable reductions in earnings uncertainty and 
consumption volatility facing individuals and households?    
We do not know the answer to this question, but we conjecture that greater 
flexibility in pay setting for workers played a role, possibly a major one. Greater pay 
flexibility is consistent with the rise in wage and earnings inequality in U.S. labor 
markets since 1980 and with increases in individual income volatility and earnings 
uncertainty.  If these developments involve a rise in the variance of idiosyncratic 24 
 
permanent income shocks to households, then household consumption volatility also rises 
according to permanent income theory.  Greater wage (and hours) flexibility also leads to 
smaller firm-level employment responses to idiosyncratic shocks and smaller aggregate 
responses to common shocks, because firms can respond by adjusting compensation 
rather than relying entirely on layoffs and hires. By the same logic, wage adjustments can 
substitute for unwanted job loss. So, at least in principle, greater wage flexibility offers a 
unified explanation for the rise in wage and earnings inequality, flat or rising volatility in 
household consumption, a decline in job-loss rates, and declines in firm-level and 
aggregate volatility measures. Sources of greater pay flexibility include the decline of 
real minimum wages, a diminished role for private sector unionism and collective 
bargaining, intensified competitive pressures that undermined rigid compensation 
structures, the growth of employee leasing and temp workers, and the erosion of norms 
that formerly restrained wage differentials and prevented wage cuts.   
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
  We summarize the main elements of our evidence and analysis.  First, 
macroeconomic volatility has generally trended downward in the postwar United States 
(and in many other countries as well), interrupted by heightened turbulence in the 1970s 
and early 1980s.  Otherwise, however, much of the Great Moderation reflects a decline in 
the high frequency component of aggregate output volatility. Second, declining volatility 
in the durable goods sector is a major contributor to declines in U.S. aggregate output 
volatility.  Third, changes in inventory behavior appear to play a major role in the decline 
of output volatility in the goods-producing sector and, hence, in the economy as a whole.  
Fourth, the broad decline in aggregate volatility is mirrored by declines in firm-level 
employment volatility and in job-loss risks for workers. Lastly, declining volatility is not 
evident in microeconomic data on wages, incomes, or consumption expenditures.  If 
anything, micro evidence on consumption volatility and other measures of individual 
uncertainty points in the opposite direction. 
From this configuration of findings, we conclude that the welfare implications of 
the Great Moderation are subtler than one might think.  While the benefits of reduced 25 
 
inflation uncertainty are well understood, the benefits on the “real” side are elusive.  It is 
likely that reduced volatility at the firm level reduces production costs, a first-order 
welfare benefit.  But the fact that it has not coincided with reduced consumption or 
income volatility for individuals and households suggests that economically meaningful 
uncertainty—the kind that affects welfare—does not have a simple and direct connection 
to aggregate output volatility.   
  Of course, more research and better data may alter our perception of the facts.  
Consumption at the individual and household level is poorly measured, and it may be that 
noisy data or idiosyncratic risks swamp the effect of lower aggregate volatility in micro 
data.  But, at this juncture, the weight of the evidence points toward a different 
conclusion: The Great Moderation brought few benefits in the form of lower 
consumption volatility or reduced economic uncertainty for individuals and households.  
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Figure 1: GDP Growth, 1947-2007
Quarterly, Annual Rate.  Source:  NIPA
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Quarterly, Annual Rate.  Source:  NIPA
Note: Grow th contributions are grow th rates scaled by the product's share in total GDP.  Thus, they are affected by trends in sector shares
over time, but the effect is very slight.
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Figure 2: GDP Growth Contributions by Major Product
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Figure 3: Volatility* over Time in Key Categories
*5-year rolling standard deviations of quarterly annualized grow th contributions.
**Inventory investment grow th contributions w ere computed by subtracting
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Figure 5: Contributions to Durables Output Variability
5-year rolling variances of growth contributions
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Figure 6:  Inventory-Sales Ratios in Durable Goods in Relation to Lead Times for 
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Pre-1984 average = 65.8
Post-1984 average = 48.0
* Source: Institute for Supply Management






 Figure 7: Volatility in Firm-Level Employment Growth Rates,  
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Notes: Firm-level volatility calculated as a ten-year weighted moving average of 
growth rates, inclusive of entry and exit and with a degrees-of-freedom 
correction.  See equation (6) in Davis et al. (2006).  Average volatility across 
firms computed on an employment-weighted basis.   
 
Source: Calculations on the Longitudinal Business Database by Davis et al. 
(2006). Figure 8: Household-Level Consumption Volatility by Deciles of Predicted Consumption 
  
 
Note: We compute the absolute value of six-month log changes in expenditures on 
nondurable goods and services per adult equivalent in each household.  Averaging the 
absolute changes by time period and decile yields the reported measure of consumption 
volatility.  
  